讲座题目：First-Price Auctions with Maxmin Expected Utility Bidders
内容摘要：This paper studies the first-price auction with independent private valuations, wherein each bidder faces ambiguity about the probability distribution from which the other bidders' valuations for the item are drawn. Each bidder is ambiguity averse and this ambiguity is represented by a set of priors. In this informational setting, the paper identifies a maxmin Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the auction. It also shows that the bidders' bids and the seller's expected revenue increase as the level of the bidders' ambiguity increases if the bidders' worst belief under the higher ambiguity level dominates the worst belief under the lower ambiguity level in terms of the inverse hazard rate. Finally, the paper shows that the seller's expected revenue from the first-price auction is greater than that from the second-price auction.