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经济学高级研究论坛第163期
时间:2021-05-18    点击数:

讲座题目:First-Price Auctions with Maxmin Expected Utility Bidders

报告人:Kwanghyun Kim

报告时间:2021年5月21日上午10:00

报告地点:经管院B247

主办单位:澳门新萄京手机版网址数理经济与数理金融系

主持人:Daehyun Kim

 

内容摘要This paper studies the first-price auction with independent private valuations, wherein each bidder faces ambiguity about the probability distribution from which the other bidders' valuations for the item are drawn. Each bidder is ambiguity averse and this ambiguity is represented by a set of priors. In this informational setting, the paper identifies a maxmin Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the auction. It also shows that the bidders' bids and the seller's expected revenue increase as the level of the bidders' ambiguity increases if the bidders' worst belief under the higher ambiguity level dominates the worst belief under the lower ambiguity level in terms of the inverse hazard rate. Finally, the paper shows that the seller's expected revenue from the first-price auction is greater than that from the second-price auction.

 

主讲人简介Kwanghyun Kim,首都经济贸易大学国际经济管理学院助理教授。伊利诺伊大学香槟分校经济学博士。主要研究领域为机制设计,微观经济理论等。